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Soviet Economic Reform
The Transition Problem




The Basic Difficulty Facing the Soviet Economy
The fundamental issue facing Soviet economic reform today is the 
problem of transition from a centralized to a decentralized economic 
system. Even if the design for a new economic mechanism were per 
fect, the dominant problem would still be: how do you get there from 
here. This paper will focus on the issue of transition—its meaning and 
its consequences for the progress of Soviet economic reform.
It is important to note from the start that while there is abundant 
Western theory to help Soviet economists design a market system, 
there is no available theory of transition from a centralized arrange 
ment of economic institutions to a decentralized one. Western econo 
mists have not been concerned with this issue, since the development 
of decentralized economic mechanisms in the West took place slowly 
over long periods of time spanning more than a century. And Soviet 
economists themselves have only recently begun to work on the issue. 
Previously it was not a subject of concern, since radical market-type 
reform itself was not openly discussed. Hence there are no theoretical 
guides, either Western or Soviet, that Soviet leaders and economists 
can draw upon as they attempt to deal with the problems of transition.
At the base of the transition problem is the interrelated nature of an 
economic system. One element of the system cannot be changed with 
out changing other elements if true change in economic behavior is to
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be achieved. Thus, to give Soviet managers decisionmaking power 
over what they are to produce, they must also be given the power to 
decide what inputs they will use: materials, labor, and machinery.
First, if managers are to have the power to decide what materials 
they will use, the centralized system of material supply, introduced in 
the 1930s, has to be abolished and a system of wholesale trade put in 
its place. But given the widespread nature of material shortages in 
Soviet industry, there is a fear that the removal of the centralized mate 
rials rationing system will exacerbate these shortages and cause mas 
sive disequilibria in the economy. Supporters of reform, however, 
argue that the rationing system itself contributes to the appearance of 
shortages, because managers, operating within the administrative cen 
tralized supply system, order an excessive amount of inputs to protect 
themselves against the inefficiencies and uncertainties of the command 
system.
Second, Soviet managers have to be given increased power over the 
hiring and firing of workers. If managers are to be encouraged to seek 
out and adopt advanced technology in the pursuit of the reform's goal 
of economic modernization, they have to have the right to adjust their 
labor force to the quantity and quality levels appropriate to the new 
technology. This means giving managers the right not only to fire 
workers who are malingering, but also those who are working hard but 
who are made redundant by the new technology. Thus the extensive 
job security enjoyed by Soviet workers, especially during the Brezhnev 
period, will be diminished. But as many Soviet economists argue, the 
Soviet guarantee of lull employment should guarantee the Soviet 
worker a job, not guarantee his job. Institutional arrangements will 
have to be expanded for handling unemployment and for the retraining 
and redistribution of labor.
Third, managers have to have the power to acquire the capital equip 
ment that they decide they need. This again involves the abolition of 
the centralized system of materials and equipment supply and its 
replacement with a market system of wholesale trade. It also involves 
the question of investment and credit. If managers are to have the 
power to acquire capital equipment on their own, then they have to
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have access to the financial means to acquire this equipment. More 
over, to maintain the goal of decentralization, the banking institutions 
that decide on the allocation of investment credit must also be decen 
tralized and should make their decisions upon the commercial credit- 
worthiness of loan applicants rather than on any centralized investment 
plan.
If this freedom for Soviet managers to acquire the inputs they decide 
they need is not to lead to rampant inflation, their demands must be 
constrained. With the removal of centralized control over supplies and 
labor, the constraint that must be instituted is a hard budget constraint. 
That is, managers must be required to cover the cost of their inputs out 
of the revenues they earn. If they fail to do so, the process of bank 
ruptcy must be enforced. Without the vulnerability to bankruptcy, the 
freeing-up of managerial decisionmaking will not work.
Furthermore, if managers are to make their own output and input 
decisions, independent of central planners, they will need meaningful 
signals with regard to economic costs and benefits so that the pursuit of 
profit will lead to the efficient use of resources. Otherwise, decentral 
ized decisionmaking will lead to substantial inefficiency and waste. 
This means the Soviet price system will have to undergo radical 
reform. Not only will subsidies have to be removed, but the system for 
setting prices will have to be changed. Buyers and sellers must be 
given the right to negotiate their own prices in a free and flexible way 
so that prices adequately reflect the conditions of supply and demand 
in the economy.
The reform of the Soviet economy is, in essence, a monetization of 
economic transactions and decisionmaking. The target planning of the 
command system is to be replaced by producer and user decisionmak 
ing involving magnitudes calibrated in monetary terms. Therefore, 
monetary stability becomes critical. Issues of macroeconomic policy 
and control—the size of the money supply and of the government defi 
cit—become of great importance. If the required monetary control is 
not exercised and if reasonable monetary stability is not achieved and 
maintained before and along with the introduction of the reforms, then
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the resulting surge of inflation will seriously weaken or destroy the 
effectiveness of the reform.
Finally, the reforms described so far may not work in the absence of 
one further element, namely, competition. Without the introduction of 
competition, without buyers being given a choice among competing 
suppliers, decentralization may not lead to the meeting of customer 
demands, efficiency, and technological dynamism, but to monopoly 
and the danger of continued technological stagnation and price infla 
tion. Therefore, an additional element of the required set of reforms 
may be the introduction of a Soviet antitrust policy.
What all of this means is that due to the interrelatedness of an eco 
nomic system, a number of reforms must be introduced more or less 
simultaneously in order for economic reform to begin to have any 
effect In other words, to get the rocket of economic reform off the 
launching pad, an initial bundle of simultaneous reforms is required. 
One of the aims of an economic theory and policy of transition should 
be the pursuit of "minimum simultaneity," i.e., the development of a 
minimum bundle of simultaneous reforms required to launch the eco 
nomic reform. For if everything has to be done at once, then the intro 
duction of a decentralizing reform would face overwhelming obstacles. 
Especially under conditions of extensive market disequilibria, an 
abrupt shift from a centralized system to a full price-profit-market- 
money system would produce chaos.
In the elaboration of a theory of transition, it is necessary that the 
destabilization produced by the introduction of institutional changes be 
constrained to a level that allows the economy to continue to function. 
Certainly this is a policy constraint demanded by political leaders. 
Officials at Gosplan and the economic ministries are criticized for con 
tinuing to operate in the old ways. But at the same time, they are held 
responsible for the performance of the economy. The only way these 
officials know how to carry out this responsibility is by means of the 
old planning and control methods.
The key problem here is that the leaders want reform, but they want 
to bring it about without acutely destabilizing the economy. The main 
tenance of some of the old forms of planning and control is necessary
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to prevent destabilization. Thus, the transition process initially 
involves the introduction of new forms alongside the old forms, rather 
than immediately in place of them, with the idea that the new forms are 
to grow and in time replace the old forms. This growth and replace 
ment process is, however, not well understood. To what extent does the 
maintenance of old forms inhibit, or even prevent, the development 
and growth of new forms, and what is the nature of the replacement 
process if it does take place?
There is, in addition, another underlying tension in the politics-eco 
nomics relationship. An effective economic mechanism is one that pro 
duces rapid adjustment to changing conditions, to changes in 
technology and changes in people's desires. But adjustment involves 
the pain of dislocation. It reduces people's security. It affects rewards 
and penalties and the distribution of income. A socialist system politi 
cizes the allocation of pain. A capitalist market system tends to depolit- 
icize it. Though people in all countries look to their governments for 
protection against pain, in socialist countries this feeling is particularly 
strong. Thus there is the danger that the political pressure for govern 
ment protection and intervention will prevent the economy from ade 
quately adjusting to change, thus inhibiting the progress of economic 
reform or limiting its effectiveness.
The Record of Reform
When Gorbachev came to power in March 1985, his initial eco 
nomic program was focused on the re-invigoration, rather than the 
reform, of the economy. Gorbachev called for growth acceleration and 
economic modernization based upon sharp increases in investment 
directed toward machine building and energy, plus extensive changes 
in administrative and management personnel. It was not until June 
1987 that discussion of serious economic reform began. At a meeting 
of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, a resolution 
calling for the radical restructuring of the Soviet economy was 
adopted. The resolution recognized that the interrelatedness of an eco-
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nomic system required a bundle of changes to be made for any real 
change in the functioning of the economy to result. It did not, however, 
appear to recognize the difficulties of transition that would be 
involved.
The June 1987 resolution was accompanied by a new law on the 
state enterprise. Together they formed a program which promised a 
substantial move toward economic decentralization. The program 
called for the virtual abolition of the annual state plan and its obliga 
tory targets, significant independence of enterprise managers from con 
trol by the center and the industrial ministries, enterprise incentives 
based on the pursuit of profit and financial responsibility, flexibility in 
the payment and allocation of labor, and reform of prices and the sys 
tem of price formation. The new system was to be in place by the 
beginning of the 1990s. Until then, some aspects of centralization were 
to be retained, e.g., the so-called "state production orders," which were 
obligatory for the enterprises to fulfill.
A year later, in June 1988, Gorbachev launched a radical political 
reform affecting both central and local governments. An elected con 
gress of people's deputies was created, which in turn elected a presi 
dent and a legislative parliament (Supreme Soviet). And local councils 
(Soviets) were to be directly elected by the people. Gorbachev appears 
to have concluded that political reform is a necessary precondition for 
economic reform. In order for economic reform to succeed, decision- 
makers must have the information they need to make decisions, and 
they must be free of arbitrary government intervention in carrying out 
their decisions. Leaders in government and in the economy must be 
accountable for the results of the actions they take. They must have 
credibility in the eyes of the people. Thus, glasnost and democratiza- 
tion are prerequisites for successful economic reform.
What can be said about the accomplishments of radical economic 
reform so far since its launching at the June 1987 meeting of the Cen 
tral Committee of the Soviet Communist party? Clearly, little progress 
has been made. The reform is barely off the launching pad. And there 
are a number of highly serious and troublesome developments, in par 
ticular the growth of inflationary forces, the spreading shortages of
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consumer goods, and the recent decreasing levels of output Indeed, a 
thick cloud of crisis hangs over the economy and the people's expecta 
tions for the future are bleak.
Among the major causes of the present situation, it can be argued, is 
first of all an initial lack of sufficient understanding and appreciation 
by Soviet economists and leaders of the macroeconomic factors 
involved in the transition to a decentralized economic mechanism. 
Wage inflation (and through it, price inflation) has been a direct func 
tion of money creation resulting from (1) the government deficit, 
which has been substantial (even when account is taken of the fact that 
in the Soviet Union most of the investment in the economy is on the 
government budget), and (2) enterprise managers' pressure to increase 
money wages far beyond increases in productivity, given the flexibility 
of the incentive wage system accompanying the reform. Much of the 
current problem of empty shelves and consumer goods shortages is 
demand-related, that is, a consequence of the sizable increases in 
money wages which would not have been possible except for the 
action of the printing presses bloating the supply of money and the 
growth of the monetary overhang in the economy.
There has also, however, been a slowdown in the growth of output. 
This has been a result of the fact that, while some of the glue of the old 
administrative-command methods of management that held the econ 
omy together has been removed, and new economic methods of man 
agement have not developed fast enough to replace it. The first element 
of the economic mechanism to be affected has been that of interenter- 
prise flows of materials. The coordination mechanism in the economy 
has been seriously weakened leading to a slowing down of growth and, 
this year, an actual decrease in output.
A further critical flaw has been the failure to introduce price reform. 
The maintenance of below-market-clearing prices, often through the 
payment of subsidies, contributes to the government deficit and to the 
prevalence of goods shortages. And the maintenance of the centralized 
system of price setting means that prices are not flexible signals of the 
relationship between supply and demand.
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Thus the simultaneity problem in the transition to a decentralized 
economic system has proved to be a formidable barrier to the progress 
of Soviet economic reform.
In light of the failure of economic reform to get started and the 
growing sense of crisis in the country, several important developments 
have occurred with regard both to increased understanding of the eco 
nomic issues and the working out of proposed programs for economic 
reform, particularly for the handling of the issue of transition.
First there has been a growing understanding among Soviet econo 
mists of the principles and importance of macroeconomic policies. Fis 
cal and monetary policies are discussed in a clear and straightforward 
manner, with the stress placed on the role they will play in the 
reformed Soviet market economy, particularly their role in managing 
inflation. Much attention in the public discussion of economic reform 
has been given to the monetary overhang and to ways of stopping its 
growth and of decreasing it: taxing excessive increase in money wages, 
and sale of shares, bonds, and apartments to the public.
Another important development in economic discussions over the 
past year has been the increasing focus on property rights and the cre 
ation of new diverse nonstate property relations. "Destatization" has 
become a rallying cry. What is of great importance here is the growing 
perception that a profit incentive is not enough to give an enterprise 
manager the needed sense of responsibility for the economic assets 
under his control. An ownership relationship is also necessary. Owner 
ship brings with it not only an interest in an increase in the flow of 
profit (income) but also an interest in an increase in the value of the 
property (wealth), which leads to the protection and nurturing of soci 
ety's assets.
In addition to the progress in understanding economic issues, there 
have been two or three major programs for economic reform put forth 
in the last year, each with a strong focus on the transition issue.
First, there was a report issued in October 1989 by the State Com 
mission on Economic Reform headed by the economist Abalkin, a 
Deputy Prime Minister in the Ryzhkov government. The report out 
lines a design for a future Soviet market economy and discusses in
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some detail the measures to be taken to move the Soviet economy 
through the transition from a centralized structure to a future decentral 
ized market structure.
The vision of a reformed Soviet economy spelled out in the report 
goes far beyond that proposed in the resolution of June 1987. While 
that resolution was ambiguous about the extent to which the new sys 
tem would be a market economy, the Abalkin report unambiguously 
envisions a market economy. It states that, on the basis of Soviet expe 
rience, there clearly is no reliable alternative to a market mechanism as 
a means of coordinating the action and interests of economic units. It 
goes on to state that the market is also the most democratic form of 
regulating economic activity. The Abalkin report makes clear that a 
market system contains an array of markets. In addition to goods mar 
kets (for both consumer goods and producer goods), it includes finan 
cial markets (markets for securities and a stock market) and labor 
markets.
The report stresses that in the reformed economy there will be many 
forms of property ownership: leasing and cooperatives, farmer and 
peasant property, joint-stock companies, corporations, joint-ventures, 
and private property (though private individual property will not be 
permitted to lead to the "exploitation of man by man"). The report also 
declares that the state should transfer the administration of the eco 
nomic property that it retains to the workers' collectives on the basis of 
lease contracts.
According to the report, the financial sector, fiscal and monetary and 
banking institutions, should be thoroughly developed. And the state 
should exercise its influence on the economy through a wide assort 
ment of economic means, fiscal and monetary policies, rather than 
administrative controls.
Finally, extensive attention is paid in the design of the reformed 
economy and (elsewhere in the report) to social guarantees for all 
members of society, including those with few skills.
A major part of the report is devoted to the issue of transition. Three 
possible approaches are discussed. What are termed the conservative 
and radical approaches are dismissed, the first because it will never
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produce any progress in reform and the second because it will lead to 
chaos. What is called the "radical-moderate" approach is the one pre 
ferred. In essence it is a step-by-step approach for preparing and then 
introducing a bundle of simultaneous reforms which include a well- 
developed set of government fiscal and monetary controls. These will 
be used to manage the inflation which is inevitable with the introduc 
tion of markets in an environment of shortages. Extensive attention in 
the report is also paid to the protection of the people in light of the 
painful adjustments required. This protection will help people adapt to 
a market system. Included here is the indexation of incomes and pen 
sions. It is clearly aimed at reviving popular support for the economic 
reform and the movement to the market.
The report also sketches out a schedule for the transition to the 
reformed economic system. Four stages are described covering the 
periods 1990, 1991-1992, 1993-1995, and 1996-2000, by the end of 
which a new economic system will be established.
The report was discussed at a large conference of economists in 
November, where it was criticized from both the right and the left. 
Conservatives attacked the conversion of the Soviet economy to a mar 
ket economy. And the radicals attacked what they considered to be the 
excessive protection of workers from the economic adjustments which 
they argued were necessary for the success of economic reform, i.e., 
the creation of a flexible, efficient, responsive economic mechanism.
In December, Prime Minister Ryzhkov stated that he supported the 
Abalkin program, but called for a two-year delay in its introduction, 
during which heavy centralized priority would be put on increasing the 
production of consumer goods to eradicate consumer shortages. This 
echo of the administrative-command approach was not well received. 
It was followed in May 1990 by a formal government plan put forth by 
Ryzhkov that was similar in some ways to the Abalkin program, but it 
called for beginning the transition to a market economy with an imme 
diate (July 1990) doubling of basic food prices, coupled with indexing 
of wages and pensions. This was rejected by the Soviet parliament, and 
Ryzhkov and Abalkin were instructed to return in September with a 
revised program.
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In the interim, dramatic changes were taking place in the Soviet 
political scene. Power was shifting from the Communist Party to the 
elected government bodies and from the Kremlin to the republics. In 
April 1990, Boris Yeltsin was elected president of the Russian repub 
lic. He made clear his intentions to assert Russian republic sovereignty 
over the economy of the Russian republic, and his intention to move 
the republic quickly—in 500 days—to a market economy. At the end 
of the Soviet Communist party congress in July, Yeltsin left the party, 
strengthening his position as an independent political force.
Gorbachev thus faced a serious challenge, particularly sharp in the 
economic sector. He responded with a compromising approach. A joint 
Gorbachev-Yeltsin working group was set up at the end of July, under 
the direction of the respected economist Shatalin, a member of Gor 
bachev's Presidential Council, with the task of drawing up a program 
for the transition to a market economy. The working group met during 
the month of August and at the beginning of September submitted a 
lengthy report, including drafts of over 20 laws, which comprised a 
program for the transition to a market economy in 500 days.
The essence of the Shatalin transition program was quite different 
from that of Ryzhkov and Abalkin. The heart of the program lay in the 
rapidity of the transition process, in the dominant role it gave to priva 
tization and to stabilization, and in its recognition of the sovereignty of 
the republics as the foundation for the creation of an economic union.
The rapidity of the transition process was symbolized by the phrase 
"500 days." This timeframe was not to be taken literally, but it repre 
sented a commitment to move ahead resolutely with a tightly 
sequenced bundle of reforms, recognizing the simultaneity problem. 
Such a commitment was critical in establishing the credibility of the 
reform program, which in turn was so important for the program's suc 
cess. Furthermore, the Shatalin group made clear that they were talking 
about the transition to a market system, not the full development of 
such a system. The latter, it was generally acknowledged, would take 
several decades.
Second, the transition to the market was to be built on the basis of 
privatization rather than on the decentralization of state enterprise
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management. Privatization was to proceed from the top (turning state 
enterprises into joint-stock companies) and from the bottom (helping 
private people to set up small and medium-sized firms, with credit and 
access to space and materials). Financial institutions necessary for 
privatization (stock markets, commodity exchanges, etc.) were to be 
setup.
Third, stabilization policies were to be introduced immediately. 
Investment financed through the state budget was to be cut sharply as 
were the defense and KGB budgets. Tight monetary policy was to be 
initiated. Monetary reform through confiscation was to be avoided. 
Rather, the monetary overhang was to be absorbed through the 
increased supply of consumer goods (production and imports) and 
sales to the public of apartments and a range of state assets. The prices 
of up to 150 basic consumer goods were to remain fixed for the entire 
period of one-and-one-half years. Reform of other prices was to start as 
soon as the stabilization program began to take hold.
The aim of the stabilization program was to make the ruble the 
accepted, totally fungible, legal tender throughout the Soviet Union. As 
some members of the Shatalin group put it, the aim was to make the 
ruble "real money."
The fourth key element in the approach of the Shatalin program was 
that it started with the recognition of the sovereignty of the republics, 
and it tried to create institutional arrangements that would encourage 
the republics to give up some of their sovereignty in order to share in 
the benefits of these arrangements. A good example of such an institu 
tion was the proposed central bank, which was designed along the lines 
of the American Federal Reserve System. The board of governors of 
the bank consisted of a chairman and representatives from each of the 
republics. Thus each republic that joined the system would have a 
voice in the setting of monetary policy for the entire economic union.
The battleground is now in the political arena. As the old economic, 
social, and political structures are being destroyed, and new structures 
are slow in developing, instability is increasing. To deal with the situa 
tion, it is necessary for Soviet political leaders, primarily Gorbachev 
and Yeltsin, to reach certain agreements. First, they must agree on the
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nature of the new Soviet political union and the level of sovereignty of 
the republics. Without this, the political power to implement economic 
reform is lost And second, they must agree on a program of economic 
reform, one that addresses the major problems of transition—"mini 
mum simultaneity," property rights, and macroeconomic balance. Two 
different approaches have already been proposed and more are possi 
ble. If they come to an agreement soon, then there is a chance that by 
the turn of the century the Soviet economy will look substantially dif 
ferent from what it was and is today, and will begin to show signs of 
becoming a market economy with economic, financial, and legal insti 
tutions resembling those of the advanced industrial nations.
If, on the other hand, there is great delay in the political acceptance 
and introduction of significant transition measures, then the disequilib- 
ria and instability in the economy will intensify and the reimposition of 
economic controls will be likely. Where this path will lead is not clear. 
It can be argued, however, that since recentralization will not solve the 
problems facing the Soviet economy, another cycle of economic 
reform will be initiated in five to ten years. In perestroika II, Soviet 
leaders and the Soviet people, with the experience they have gained, 
may be more successful in dealing with economic reform and its tran 
sition problems, and a Soviet market economy may begin to take shape 
toward the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century.
